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ABSTRACT 
Recently, power system networks have become more dependent on new technologies 
especially in using a communication network to enhance the overall performance of 
system operation. The communication network facilities are applied to send and 
receive data and commands through the wide-area power network. However, this 
dependency has opened a new threat of fake tripping contingency towards the power 
system operation. This challenge has motivated this study to ensure that all analytical 
tools applied during power system operation are not affected under fake tripping 
contingency, especially on dynamic security assessment (DSA) classifier. To address 
this challenge, this study aims to invistigate the impact of fake tripping contingency 
on the power system security via DSA classifier, then develop a novel hybrid 
approach for DSA classifier based on advanced feature selection technique for 
decision tree (DT) classifier and finally evaluate the performance of DSA classifier 
under normal and fake tripping contingencies, in terms of accuracy and 
computational time. he hybrid logistic model tree (hybrid LMT) approach proposed 
in this study combines the symmetrical uncertainties (SU) algorithm and the logistic 
model tree (LMT) algorithm. The training dataset is built by applying all possible 
contingencies during normal and fake tripping scenarios to the test system models. 
The effectiveness of the proposed approach is demonstrated on modified IEEE 9-, 
14-, and 30-bus test system models due to the limitations in the simulator program. 
The results indicate that the hybrid LMT accurately assesses the dynamic security 
status of the system under normal and fake tripping contingencies with short time 
frame. The results show that the proposed method has 98.4126%, 98.3606%, and 
99.537% accuracy and requires 22.22%, 23.529 % and 25.27% less computational 
time as compared to the conventional LMT algorithm in assessing the dynamic 
security status of the IEEE 3-machıne 9-bus, the IEEE 5-machıne 14-bus, and the 
IEEE 6-machıne 30-bus test system models, respectively. In summary, the results 
obtained in this study offer accurate and high-speed information for the dynamic 
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security state, which makes DSA classifier able to provide vital information for 
protection and control applications to keep the power system in a secure and reliable 
state.  
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ABSTRAK 
Terkini, rangkaian sistem kuasa semakin bergantung kepada teknologi baru, 
terutamanya kepada penggunaan rangkaian komunikasi untuk meningkatkan prestasi 
keseluruhan operasi sistem tersebut. Kemudahan rangkaian komunikasi digunakan 
untuk menghantar dan menerima data serta arahan melalui rangkuman meluas 
rangkaian kuasa. Namun, pergantungan ini telah mencipta suatu ancaman baharu 
iaitu kontingensi gangguan palsu terhadap operasi sistem kuasa. Cabaran ini telah 
mendorong kajian ini untuk memastikan bahawa semua peralatan analisis yang 
digunakan sepanjang operasi sistem kuasa tidak akan terkesan akibat kontingensi 
gangguan palsu, terutamanya terhadap pengkelas penilaian keselamatan dinamik 
(DSA). Untuk menangani cabaran ini, kajian ini berusaha untuk mengkaji kesan 
kontingensi gangguan palsu terhadap keselamatan sistem kuasa melalui pengkelas 
DSA. Kemudian, kajian ini akan membangunkan suatu pendekatan hibrid baharu 
untuk pengkelas DSA berasaskan teknik pemilihan ciri lanjutan untuk pengkelas 
pokok keputusan (D ), dan akhir sekali, menilai prestasi pengkelas DSA di bawah 
kontingensi normal dan kontingensi gangguan palsu, dari segi ketepatan dan masa 
pengiraan. Pendekatan pokok model logistik hibrid (LMT) yang dicadangkan di 
dalam kajian ini menggabungkan algoritma ketakpastian simetri (SU) dan algoritma 
pokok model logistik (LMT). Set data latihan dibina dengan menggunakan semua 
kemungkinan kontingensi semasa senario serangan normal dan serangan gangguan 
palsu ke atas model-model sistem ujian. Keberkesanan pendekatan yang dicadangkan 
ini dibuktikan melalui model-model sistem ujian terubahsuai IEEE 9-, 14-, dan 30-
bas akibat kekangan di dalam program simulator. Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa 
LMT hibrid ini berjaya menilai status keselamatan dinamik sistem secara tepat di 
bawah kontingensi normal dan kontingensi gangguan palsu dalam tempoh yang 
singkat. Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa kaedah yang dicadangkan mempunyai 
98.4126%, 98.3606%, dan 99.537% ketepatan dan memerlukan 22.22%, 23.529%, 
dan 25.27% kurang masa pengiraan berbanding dengan algoritma LMT yang 
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konvensional dalam menilai status keselamatan dinamik model-model sistem ujian 
masing-masing IEEE 3-mesin 9-bas, IEEE 5-mesin 14-bas, dan IEEE 6-mesin 30-
bas. Kesimpulannya, keputusan yang diperoleh di dalam kajian ini menawarkan 
maklumat yang tepat dan berkelajuan tinggi untuk keadaan keselamatan dinamik 
yang menjadikan pengkelas DSA berupaya memberikan maklumat penting untuk 
perlindungan dan aplikasi kawalan demi memastikan sistem kuasa berada di dalam 
keadaan yang selamat dan boleh dipercayai. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The electric power system network is the backbone of energy in any country. It is 
responsible for transmitting power to the customers from the generation side through 
a wide and complex network that includes a huge number of devices and equipment. 
In general, this network contains two crucial layers. The first layer is responsible for 
facilitating electricity flows from the utility to the customer. This layer is divided 
into three main sections, namely, generation, transmission, and distribution. The 
second layer is responsible for facilitating communication for power system 
operation. This layer sends control commands and receives information from the 
power carry layer to the control center. Figure 1.1 shows the general layers in a 
power grid infrastructure. 
The communication network layer includes different media, such as 
telephone lines, microwaves, satellites, and fiber optics. The communication network 
offers many advantages for the control center operation, while simultaneously 
reducing the operation cost for the power system. Therefore, electrical utilities have 
made various efforts to develop this vital network and its operation. However, a 
communication network is prone to failures due to different reasons, which include 
human error, malfunctioning of equipment, and limitations of the communication 
architecture and cyber-attack. Based on a report by the North American Electric 
Reliability Council (NERC), failures in communication and information system is 
the root cause of 32% of power outages [2]. For example, one of the reasons for the 
North America blackout in 2003 was a computer system’s failure that send an 
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unwanted alarm signal to the control center [3]. Therefore, communication failures 
have a significant impact on power system operation. 
 
Figure 1.1: Power grid infrastructure [1] 
The high integration of communication technology into the power grid which 
uses a weak secured communication protocol in sending and receiving data and 
commands through wide power network makes it more vulnerable to the new threat 
to the power grid that is fake tripping. Where fake tripping could trigger the circuit 
breaker (open/close) and cause a fake tripping contingency on the power system. One 
off fake tripping is cyber-attack [4]. Based on Cyber Threat and Vulnerability 
Analysis of the U.S. Electric Sector report, cyber-attack is “an attempt to infiltrate 
information technology systems, computer networks, or individual computers with a 
malicious intent to steal information, cause damage, or destroy specific targets within 
the system” [5]. The impact of a cyber-attack in the power system could be 
devastating for electric companies and users. This is for the ability of the attacker to 
make a direct impact on the power transmission operation. The cyber-attack could 
access the communication network via various technical channels where an attacker 
could exploit the weaknesses in protection procedures or the weaknesses in data 
encryption sent over the wide network. 
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In general, a cyber-attack in the power system can be classified into two 
types: individual and non-individual. The individual attack is simpler between these 
two attacks where the target of this one is to change the consumed power by the 
users by hacking the smart electric meter to reduce the cost of electricity bills [6]. 
While, the non-individual attack is the dangerous attack aiming to cut off the 
electrical service by trying to access the generators, control or protection devices or 
control for the drop load. This kind of attack is usually based on the ideology 
adopted by the attackers, such as terrorism or political conflicts. As an example, the 
Ukraine blackout in December 2015 was due to a confirmed cyber-attack [7].  
It is worth noting that the main concern with cyber-attacks is that: the attacker 
will always try to cause major harm to the power grid by using different ways and 
techniques that could give them the authorizing access to the grid, without leaving 
any "fingerprints" if possible (e.g., there are various ways and channels for these 
attackers to gain access to the network). Meanwhile, the main target of the control 
center is to keep the power system secure by using traditional techniques and 
training. Thus, each one has a different perspective and training. Therefore, it is very 
challenging for the network operator to consider or estimate all possible attack 
scenarios in a very wide and complex system. There is no guarantee that the power 
grid can be 100% secured from cyber-attacks since the game between an attacker and 
a control center is a dynamic game. To develop a better defense strategy for the 
power grid, the control center should follow an optimization approach for example 
using Game Theory [8] to reach a strategy where the system has no incentive to 
change its strategy (Nash Equilibrium), taking into account normal and cyber-attack 
contingencies as cost functions in the optimization design. Definitely, this kind of 
defense strategy could not prevent cyber-attacker, but it is able to help system 
operator to mitigate the server of cyber-attack contingency and prevent the blackout.  
In order to keep the power system in a reliable and secure state, control 
centers should evaluate the security of the system following contingencies via a 
dynamic security assessment (DSA) tool. The DSA is an essential tool for 
monitoring and of assessing the state of security of the power system’s behaviors 
(meaning secure or insecure) after a contingency has occurred. Therefore, studying 
the impact of contingency that is caused by fake tripping towards DSA is very 
important for the control center to improve network response against this kind of 
attack.  
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Traditionally, DSA includes multiple-algebra equations that could consume a 
long time to solve. Moreover, the study of DSA based on the normal contingencies 
that arises from lightning, normal failure of the protection devices, and overload. 
Recently, with the continued growth in the size of power networks, which is 
accompanied by implementation of many new technologies (e.g. as Phasor 
Measurement Units, smart grids and smart meters) that have helped to provide a 
snapshot for system state and at the same time leads to an increase in the data that 
needs to be processed when the contingency occurs. Additionally, with the increased 
probability of exposure to cyber-attacks on the power grid, the control center should 
develop a DSA tool that meets the needs for assessing dynamic security state with 
accurate result and a short time frame [9-12] and develop a better defense strategy to 
protect the power system against new threats that are fake tripping related and 
include it in simulations and analyses of the DSA tool.  
In this study, a new approach has been developed for DSA tool to deal with 
online DSA challenges also to represent and analyze the effect of "fake tripping 
contingency" on the power system security via DSA tool. The target was to build an 
accurate and high-speed classifier. Thus the control center could trigger the accurate 
protection procedures to protect the power system where wrong protection steps 
could result in a high cost for the system operator. 
1.2 Problem Statements 
The power system network is one of the most complex human-made set-ups in the 
world. This network includes very large transmission line equipment that are 
installed in a sprawling geographical area which has different operation and 
environment factors. Security for power system is a crucial aspect, it prevents the 
occurrence of a blackout.  Recently, the power system has witnessed many blackouts 
due to different types of contingencies affecting millions of people. 
To ensure a continuous work of the power system network, control center 
must keep it in a secure state following contingencies to prevent blackout occurrence, 
DSA tool is used to evaluate the ability of the power system to withstand sudden 
disturbances and to survive the transition to an acceptable steady state. Then based 
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on the assessment for DSA, the operator could activate an accurate and fast 
protection processes to protect the network. 
Based on the reviewed papers in this study, the new operating environment 
for power system made the DSA tool facing many challenges such as increased 
number of contingencies, a huge amount of measurement data stream from different 
network devices, which should be processed within a short time frame. Moreover, 
because the network is depending on the new weakly protected communication 
technology, a new threat to the power network which is originating from severe fake 
tripping contingency has appeared.  This kind of contingency could be severe on the 
power security state due to the limitations of traditional defense and analysis 
strategies for the control center to deal with this kind of recent contingency. 
There are several reported attempts to improve the DSA tools application in 
the literature such as the use of traditional time-domain simulation or data mining 
technologies. These approaches used the conventional DSA which is developed 
based on normal contingency evaluations only and this security criterion for power 
network operation is inadequate to address fake tripping contingency events. Despite 
the mentioned attempts, it remains a challenging task for the DSA tool in the present 
and future requirements to evaluate security system state due to the DSA 
computational complexity that is incurred by the massive scale data of the power 
network which increases every year and the large list of the contingencies.  
Therefore, a new approach should be adopted to improve DSA classifier 
towards these recent and future challenges by trying to study the effect of a new 
threat of fake tripping contingency on power grid security state. Moreover, finding 
technical ways to reduce the stream dataset features in an effective way to enhance 
the result in terms of accuracy along with speed. The target is to build a robust DSA 
classifier that could be used to provide vital information for protection and control 
applications in power system operation to keep the network in a secure state and 
prevent the occurrence of blackouts. 
Figure 1.2 briefly shows the research problem, its challenge, and the 
proposed solution. 
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Figure 1.2: The main ideas of this study 
1.3 Research Objectives 
This research aims to achieve the following objectives:   
i) To study the effects of fake tripping contingencies on the power 
system security via DSA. 
ii) To develop a novel hybrid approach for DSA classifier based on 
advanced feature selection technique for decision tree (DT) classifier.  
iii) To evaluate the performance of DSA classifier under normal and fake 
tripping contingencies, in terms of accuracy and computational time. 
1.4 Research Scope 
This research is limited to the following scope: 
i) The simulators of the power system respond to normal and fake 
tripping contingencies for dynamic security assessment are carried out 
on the PowerWorld simulator platform.  
ii) Symmetrical uncertainty (SU) is considered as a feature selection 
algorithm to reduce the redundant and irrelevant features in the 
dataset.  
iii) Logistic Model Tree (LMT) is considered as the decision tree 
algorithm to develop the classifier model for the DSA. 
iv) Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) program was 
uesd for implementing data mining technology. 
v) The proposed algorithm is evaluated on the modified IEEE 9-bus, 14-
bus, and 30-bus benchmark test systems model. 
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